Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans

Reciprocal altruism has been the backbone of research on the evolution of altruistic behaviour towards non-kin, but recent research has begun to apply costly signalling theory to this problem. In addition to signalling resources or abilities, public generosity could function as a costly signal of cooperative intent, benefiting altruists in terms of (i) better access to cooperative relationships and (ii) greater cooperation within those relationships. When future interaction partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, this could lead to competition to be more generous than others. Little empirical work has tested for the possible existence of this 'competitive altruism'. Using a cooperative monetary game with and without opportunities for partner choice and signalling cooperative intent, we show here that people actively compete to be more generous than others when they can benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships, and the most generous people are correspondingly chosen more often as cooperative partners. We also found evidence for increased scepticism of altruistic signals when the potential reputational benefits for dishonest signalling were high. Thus, this work supports the hypothesis that public generosity can be a signal of cooperative intent, which people sometimes 'fake' when conditions permit it.     

Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.     

The continuous public goods game and the evolution of cooperative sex ratios

Some animals, such as Melittobia wasps and surface-living mites, have extremely female-biased sex ratios that cannot be explained by the existing local mate competition (LMC) theories. The restricted production of sons may entail cooperation among mothers, enabling the production of more daughters and avoiding severe competition among sons for insemination access. These unusual examples are characterized by the long-term cohabitation of egg-layers (foundresses) on resource patches and possible contact with oviposited eggs. By applying the logic of mutual policing, we develop a novel game theoretical model for the evolution of cooperation in sex-ratio traits. This is the first attempt to model the evolution of sex ratios based on iterated games. We assumed that foundresses have two abilities to enable mutual policing: they can monitor the sex ratio in the resource patch, and they can punish defectors that produce an overabundance of males. Numerical analysis and evolutionary simulations demonstrate that cooperative low sex ratios can evolve when the number of foundresses per patch is sufficiently small. Our model predicts a slight, but steady increase in oviposition sex ratios with an increase in the number of foundresses, which mimics the phenomenon observed in several animals with extremely female-biased sex ratios. We also discuss the relationship between our model and other models of sex-ratio evolution.     

Emergence and resilience of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma via a reward mechanism

We study the problem of the emergence of cooperation in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma. The pioneering work by Nowak and May [1992. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 415, 424-426] showed that large initial populations of cooperators can survive and sustain cooperation in a square lattice with imitate-the-best evolutionary dynamics. We revisit this problem in a cost-benefit formulation suitable for a number of biological applications. We show that if a fixed-amount reward is established for cooperators to share, a single cooperator can invade a population of defectors and form structures that are resilient to re-invasion even if the reward mechanism is turned off. We discuss analytically the case of the invasion by a single cooperator and present agent-based simulations for small initial fractions of cooperators. Large cooperation levels, in the sustainability range, are found. In the conclusions we discuss possible applications of this model as well as its connections with other mechanisms proposed to promote the emergence of cooperation.     

Nest connectivity and colony structure in unicolonial Argentine ants

Unicolonial ant colonies occupy many nests and individuals rarely show aggression across large geographic distances. These traits make it difficult to detect colony structure. Here we identify colony structure at scales of hundreds of square-meters, within an invasive population of unicolonial Argentine ants. In experiments using labeled food, and in a 3-year census of nests and trails, we found that food was shared and nests were linked by trails at distances up to 50 meters. Food was not distributed to all nearby Argentine ant nests, showing that ants tend to share resources within a spatially bounded group of nests. The spatial extent of food sharing increased from winter to summer. Across different habitats and nest densities, nests were consistently aggregated at spatial scales of 3- 4 meters in radius. This suggests that new nests bud from old nests at short distances regardless of local conditions. We suggest that a ‘colony’ of Argentine ants could be defined as a group of nests among which ants travel and share food. In our study population, colonies occupy up to 650 m² and contain as many as 5 million ants. In combination with previous work showing that there is genetic differentiation among nests at similar spatial scales, the results suggest that Argentine ant populations do not function ecologically as single, large supercolonies, but instead as mosaics of smaller, distinct colonies consisting of groups of interacting nests. Received 6 June 2008; revised 30 June 2008; accepted 2 July 2008.     

Multi-parameter automodels and their applications

Motivated by the modelling of non-Gaussian data or positivelycorrelated data on a lattice, extensions of Besag's automodelsto exponential families with multi-dimensional parameters havebeen proposed recently. We provide a multiple-parameter analogueof Besag's one-dimensional result that gives the necessary formof the exponential families for the Markov random field's conditionaldistributions. We propose estimation of parameters by maximumpseudolikelihood and give a proof of the consistency of theestimators for the multi-parameter automodel. The methodologyis illustrated with examples, in particular the building ofa cooperative system with beta conditional distributions. Wealso indicate future applications of these models to the analysisof mixed-state spatial data.     

Mutualism,reciprocity, or kin selection? Cooperative rescue of a conspecific from a boa in a nocturnal solitary forager the gray mouse lemur

Predator mobbing is a widespread phenomenon in many taxa but the evolution of cooperative mobbing as an adaptive behavior is still subject to debate. Here, we report evidence for cooperative predator defense in a nocturnal solitarily foraging primate, the gray mouse lemur (Microcebus murinus). Several mouse lemurs mobbed a snake that held a non-related male conspecific until he could escape. Evolutionary hypotheses to explain cooperative mobbing include (1) by-product mutualism, when individuals defend others in the process of defending themselves; (2) reciprocity, where animals achieve a higher fitness when helping each other than when they do not cooperate; and (3) kin selection where animals help each other only if they share genes by common descent. Owing to the solitary activity of this species, reciprocity seems to be least likely to explain our observations. By-product mutualism cannot be ruled out entirely but, if costs of snake mobbing are relatively low, the available detailed socio-genetic information indicates that kin selection, rather than any of the other proposed mechanisms, is the primary evolutionary force behind the observed cooperative rescue.     

Social games between bonobos and humans: evidence for shared intentionality?

Triadic social games are interesting from a cognitive perspective because they require a high degree of mutual social awareness. They consist of two agents incorporating an object in turn-taking sequences and require individuals to coordinate their attention to the task, the object, and to one another. Social games are observed commonly in domesticated dogs interacting with humans, but they have received only little empirical attention in nonhuman primates. Here, we report observations of bonobos (Pan paniscus) engaging in social games with a human playmate. Our behavioral analyses revealed that the bonobos behaved in many ways similar to human children during these games. They were interested in the joint activity, rather than the play objects themselves, and used communicative gestures to encourage reluctant partners to perform their role, suggesting rudimentary understanding of others' intentions. Our observations thus may imply that shared intentionality, the ability to understand and shares intention with other individuals, has emerged in the primate lineage before the origins of hominids.     

Social semantics: toward a genuine pluralism in the study of social behaviour

Pluralism is the coexistence of equivalent theoretical frameworks, either because they are historically entrenched or because they achieve separate insights by viewing the same process in different ways. A recent article by West et al. [Journal of Evolutionary Biology (2007) vol. 20, 415-432] attempts to classify the many equivalent frameworks that have been developed to study the evolution of social behaviour. This article addresses shortcomings in the West et al.'s article, especially with respect to multilevel selection, in a common effort to maximize the benefits of pluralism while minimizing the semantic costs.     

Distinguishing four fundamental approaches to the evolution of helping

The evolution and stability of helping behaviour has attracted great research efforts across disciplines. However, the field is also characterized by a great confusion over terminology and a number of disagreements, often between disciplines but also along taxonomic boundaries. In an attempt to clarify several issues, we identify four distinct research fields concerning the evolution of helping: (1) basic social evolution theory that studies helping within the framework of Hamilton's inclusive fitness concept, i.e. direct and indirect benefits, (2) an ecological approach that identifies settings that promote life histories or interaction patterns that favour unconditional cooperative and altruistic behaviour, e.g. conditions that lead to interdependency or interactions among kin, (3) the game theoretic approach that identifies strategies that provide feedback and control mechanisms (protecting from cheaters) favouring cooperative behaviour (e.g. pseudo-reciprocity, reciprocity), and (4) the social scientists' approach that particularly emphasizes the special cognitive requirements necessary for human cooperative strategies. The four fields differ with respect to the 'mechanisms' and the 'conditions' favouring helping they investigate. Other major differences concern a focus on either the life-time fitness consequences or the immediate payoff consequences of behaviour, and whether the behaviour of an individual or a whole interaction is considered. We suggest that distinguishing between these four separate fields and their complementary approaches will reduce misunderstandings, facilitating further integration of concepts within and across disciplines.